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confine itself to the creation of practice and
knowledge. It also makes sweeping, and at
times flamboyant, Last Judgements about
scientific practice and knowledge as a
whole, as in the concluding chapters of The
Golem5 and Constructing Quarks2. It is this
aspect of the SSK literature that is our first
concern, for these judgements can be
‘understood’ by laymen and
schoolchildren, whereas the technical parts
of the case studies cannot.
As to prediction, of course “later
predictive success cannot be appealed to as
a cause of earlier acceptance”. We made no
such appeal in bringing up chaotic motion
in the Solar System and the Planck
spectrum of the cosmic background
radiation, which were discovered long after
classical mechanics and the quantum
theory had become firmly accepted. They
are among many examples that illustrate
the astonishing (and mysterious) ability of
science to account for phenomena of which
no inkling was available when the relevant
theories were first accepted. The SSK
literature is biased because it does not
include case studies of such episodes, nor of
experiments that test established theory to
high accuracy.
Rather, it devotes great attention to two
other topics: first, to the undeniable fact
that scientific practice and knowledge rarely
conform to any known set of philosophical
ground rules; second, to features of
scientific knowledge that are common to
knowledge as a whole. Such commonalities
abound; scientific knowledge is generated
in ways that have typically human
characteristics. But the end product is very
different from those of virtually all other
human activities.
SSK argues that scientists make choices
contingent on culture. There is truth to
this. But if that were all — if there were as
much freedom to choose as SSK claims — a
good portion of the major theories whose
acceptance had been successfully
‘negotiated’ should fail disastrously in
regimes where they were supposed to work,
as popular policies often do in a
democracy. Why scientific knowledge is, in
contrast, so robust is not explained by the
canon of SSK.
Collins and Pinch say that the
“evaluation of scientific findings is not our
business” (a position they share with Bloor
and MacKenzie). Pickering, in contrast,
evaluates the findings of particle physics in
part as a former professional particle
physicist with his own unusual scientific
views (see pages 250–252 of ref. 4).
Constructing Quarks is a “best,
empirical, case-study”, to use Bloor and
MacKenzie’s term. Nevertheless, having
been active participants in the move to the
new physics, we disagree with Pickering’s
conclusion that “objective merit” was not
“what induced most physicists to move”.
Indeed, consider the following statement in
Pickering’s account (see page 411 of ref. 2):
“...the world of the old physics was
conceptually and socially fragmented.
Traditions organized around different
phenomena generated little support for
one another…. With the advent of the new
physics, the conceptual unification of
forces was accompanied by a social
unification of practice. The quark-gauge
theory world view was at the heart of a
community-wide symbiosis of experiment
and theory.” 
As our essay explained, we agree with an
edited version of this statement; the old
physics was fragmented because there were
few theoretical connections between its
various models and recipes, whereas the
new was a powerful theory that provided a
unified account and unambiguous
predictions, some of which were quickly
confirmed. Pickering means his statement
to be read as saying that unification was
primarily a social phenomenon, “a
communal search for a congenial world: a
world in which practice could be socially
organized”, and it is this claim that
underlies his final verdict against the
objectivity of modern science.
Finally, to Capasso’s excellent letter. We
set technology aside because we could not
do justice to it in the space allotted.
Technology plays an essential role as both
input and output in the processes of
continuous improvement of scientific
practice and knowledge after a theory is
born, a topic to which SSK gives little
notice. This is part of a larger problem we
often encounter in the SSK literature: an
inadequate description of the culture of
physics — of the conceptual, historical
and technological context in which
research in modern physics is actually
done.
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Patents and royalties
Sir — Philippe Ducor points out in his
Commentary (Nature 387, 13–14; 1997)
that due to “the wise licensing policy of
non-exclusivity and modest pricing
adopted by the owner (Stanford
University), [recombinant DNA]
technology was widely distributed and
contributed enormously to the subsequent
development of commercial biotechnology.
However, the outcome would have been
radically different if Stanford had chosen
instead a restrictive licensing strategy… or
granted no licences.” 
This is true. But this policy was set
carefully so as to generate the largest
possible return without causing the patent
to be contested. Companies wishing to use
the technology weighed the cost of royalties
against the cost of a suit and eventually all
decided it was cheaper to pay royalties. If
one of the other options suggested had
been taken, it is likely that the patent would
have been contested and there is a
significant probability that the patent
would have been ruled invalid.
Stanford and the University of
California have already gathered hundreds
of millions of dollars in royalties on this
basic patent, despite the “modest pricing”.
The work that gave rise to this technology
and its key patents was paid for by ordinary
people through their tax dollars used for
basic research. Ordinary people have
subsequently had to pay many times over
the original investment through patent
royalties. Should people be penalized 
for having spent tax money wisely in the
first place? 
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There were two errors in the figures in Gottfried
and Wilson’s article1. The corrected Fig. 1 (above)
illustrates the coupling constant (as) of QCD as
determined today from various experiments and
calculations, compared with the range of values
determined in 1983. The term “Fragmentation”
was incorrectly labelled “1983”. In Fig. 2, the green
line referred to in the caption was incorrectly
printed blue.
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